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Abstract
We design a simple ascending-price algorithm to compute a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium in
Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with weak gross substitute (WGS) property, which runs in time
polynomial in market parameters and log 1/ε. This is the first polynomial-time algorithm for most of
the known tractable classes of Arrow-Debreu markets, which is easy to implement and avoids heavy
machinery such as the ellipsoid method. In addition, our algorithm can be applied in unknown market
setting without exact knowledge about the number of agents, their individual utilities and endowments.
Instead, our algorithm only relies on queries to a global demand oracle by posting prices and receiving
aggregate demand for goods as feedback. When demands are real-valued functions of prices, the oracles
can only return values of bounded precision based on real utility functions. Due to this more realistic
assumption, precision and representation of prices and demands become a major technical challenge,
and we develop new tools and insights that may be of independent interest.
Furthermore, our approach also gives the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact
equilibrium for markets with spending constraint utilities, a piecewise linear concave generalization of
linear utilities. This resolves an open problem posed in [24].
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1 Introduction
The concept of market equilibrium is central in economics and captures fair, stable, and efficient outcomes
in competitive allocation scenarios. The most prominent model to study market equilibria are exchange
markets [1], which consist of a set of divisible goods and a set of agents. Each agent has an initial
endowment of goods and a utility (preference) function over bundles of goods. Given prices of goods,
each agent buys a most preferred bundle (called demand) that is affordable from the earned money. At
equilibrium, market clears, i.e., demand meets supply.
The computation of market equilibrium is a fundamental problem in economics and computer sci-
ence [2, 25, 26, 38]. The challenge is to provide algorithms to compute an (approximate) market equi-
librium efficiently. After more than a decade of research on this issue in theoretical computer sci-
ence [7, 8, 13–15,20,21,24,29,32,36,43], there is a fairly good understanding of tractable and intractable
domains (assuming P 6= PPAD). For exchange markets, the tractable case is essentially1 given by markets
with a weak gross-substitutes (WGS) property, where any increase in prices of a set of goods does not
strictly decrease the demand of untouched goods. This includes markets with many popular and inter-
esting classes of utility functions [34], for example utilities with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
with 0 < ρ < 1, Cobb-Douglas utilities, linear utilities, or utilities with spending constraints2 [22, 42].
The only general approach to compute an approximate market equilibrium for this class of markets uses
the ellipsoid method and convex feasibility programs [14].
Algorithms based on the ellipsoid method, although being polynomial time in principle, have a number
of undesirable drawbacks. First, the ellipsoid method often tends to be slow in practice. Moreover, such
algorithms often are not informative about the problem structure since they invoke a powerful algorithmic
tool in a “black-box” fashion. In many algorithmic domains it has become an important line of research
to avoid black-box application of the ellipsoid method and derive simpler, “combinatorial” algorithms
that reveal inherent structure. Thereby, such algorithms also avoid possible overhead that comes with
the application of broad algorithmic hammers and tend to be much faster. Despite extensive research [12–
14,32], the search for a simple and direct polynomial-time algorithm for computing market equilibria has
so far been unsuccessful. The only exceptions are a classic strongly polynomial-time algorithm for the
case of Cobb-Douglas utilities [26], and recent combinatorial algorithms for linear utilities [23,24].
A prerequisite for all these efficient algorithms is the entire description of the market including number
of agents, their utility functions and initial endowments. Obtaining this description is a highly non-trivial
task; an entire theory of revealed preferences [37, 40, 41] was developed to study how to infer market
parameters from observed prices and buying patterns. Further, sometimes agents’ preferences can be
complicated, and their utility function may not have any succinct representation. This gives rise to the
following question: Can we design efficient algorithms that are oblivious to market parameters? In other
words, are there efficient algorithms for unknown markets?
Even beyond the economic interpretation, algorithms for computing market equilibria have wide ap-
plicability. For example, proportionally-fair allocations, which result from market equilibria, are widely
used in the design of computer networks [33]. Recent applications also include energy-efficient schedul-
ing [30, 31] and fair allocation of indivisible resources [17, 18]. In the latter application, a combinatorial
polynomial-time algorithm developed for linear markets [36] is extended to a problem, for which no con-
vex programming formulation is known. This further highlights the importance of designing algorithms
without the ellipsoid method that are simple and flexible to adjust to applications in related domains.
In this paper, we design simple ascending price algorithms for WGS exchange markets. Under the
1The other tractable cases are CES utilities with −1 ≤ ρ < 0 [12], and piecewise linear concave utilities provided that
the number of goods are constant [20].
2Spending constraint utilities are a piecewise linear concave generalization of linear utilities, which satisfy many desirable
properties and have many additional applications.
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standard assumptions that the most preferred bundles are unique and continuous in all prices, our algo-
rithm computes an (1+ε)-approximate market equilibrium in polynomial time, i.e., in time polynomial in
market parameters and log(1/ε). In markets with linear and spending constraint utilities the uniqueness
and continuity assumptions do not hold. Thus, even with tie-breaking rules that imply the WGS prop-
erty, the existing algorithms for general WGS markets are not applicable. Instead, our algorithm can be
adapted when using an appropriate tie-breaking rule for demands. We improve over the FPTAS [22] in
terms of running time from 1/ε2 to log(1/ε). More importantly, the log(1/ε)-dependence of the running
time allows us to convert the approximate equilibrium to an exact one in polynomial time when given
all utility parameters. We obtain the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact market
equilibrium for spending constraint utilities and settle an open question raised by [24].
All our results are achieved by a unifying framework that works directly on the price vector. It uses
simple binary search to identify suitable multiplicative price updates for subsets of goods. As such, our
approach is extremely easy to implement and, in particular, avoids black-box use of the ellipsoid method.
Furthermore, by working on the full generality of exchange markets, our algorithms can be applied to the
simpler case of Fisher markets [6]3.
Moreover, to compute approximate equilibria our algorithms do not require access to an explicit
description of the utility functions and endowments of the agents. Instead, the algorithms even work in
what we term unknown markets – the number of agents, the agents’ endowments and utilities all remain
unknown. As in the case of tâtonnment algorithms [3–5, 10, 11, 16, 39], we assume these parameters can
only be queried implicitly via aggregate demand queries. In such a query, we present a non-negative
price for each good. For each agent, the oracle translates the endowment of each agent into money and
determines a utility-maximizing bundle of goods for the money. It then aggregates the demands for
each good and returns the vector of aggregate demands as answer to the query. Note that for many
WGS markets these demand oracles can be easily implemented, e.g., for CES utilities there are even
closed-form formulas. For suitable tie-breaking, we can even apply the algorithms to unknown markets
with linear and spending constraint utilities, which have non-continuous demand. Perhaps surprisingly,
our tâtonnement-style algorithms succeed to detect implicitly all relevant information and changes in
preferences in an unknown market setting. This requires to overcome a number of technical challenges
and introduction of new techniques that we discuss in more detail below.
1.1 Model and Notation
Exact and Approximate Market Equilibrium In an exchange market there is a set A of n agents
and a set G of m goods. Each agent i has an initial endowment wij ∈ R≥0 of good j. We denote the
total endowment of good j by wj =
∑
i∈A wij and assume w.l.o.g. that wj = 1,∀j ∈ G. An allocation
x = (xij)i∈A,j∈G is an assignment of goods to agents such that xij ≥ 0,∀i ∈ A, j ∈ G, and ∑i xij = 1.
Each agent i has a utility function ui(xi) which specifies the value agent receives from his bundle xi.
An (exact) market equilibrium is a pair (x,p), where x is an allocation and p = (pj)j∈G is a vector of
non-negative prices pj ≥ 0. In a market equilibrium, each agent obtains a budget of money by selling
his endowment at the given prices. Then xi represents a utility-maximizing bundle of goods that he can
afford to buy at the current prices for his budget. We call such a bundle a demand bundle of agent i. In
addition, we say xj =
∑
i xij is the demand for good j in allocation x.
Definition 1.1. A bundle xi is a demand of agent i at prices p if ui(xi) = max{ui(yi) | yi ∈ Rm≥0,pTyi ≤
pTwi}. A pair (x,p) is a market equilibrium if (1) xi is a demand of agent i at p, and (2)∑i xij =∑iwij
3Fisher markets are a subclass of exchange markets where buyers and sellers are different agents. Buyers bring money to
buy goods while sellers bring goods to earn money.
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for each good j ∈ G. If a pair (x,p) is not a market equilibrium, the excess demand zj = xj−1 is non-zero
for at least one good j ∈ G.
Let us consider a concept of strong approximate market equilibrium [14]. It relaxes only the market
clearing constraint but not the condition that xi is a demand for each agent i.
Definition 1.2. A pair (p,x) is a µ-approximate equilibrium (µ ≥ 1) if (1) for each agent i, xi is a
demand of agent i at prices p, and (2)
∑
i xij ≤ µ
∑
iwij for each good j.
In Fisher markets [6], agents are divided into buyers and sellers. Each buyer i comes with an initial
endowment of money Bi. Each seller i has an initial endowment of goods wi. Each buyer has no value
for money and is only interested in buying goods, and each seller is only interested in obtaining money.
Fisher markets are a special case of exchange markets when we interpret money as a separate good.
Utility Functions Algorithms for computing market equilibria rely on structural properties of the
utility functions. A natural class are linear utilities when each agent i has non-negative values uij ≥ 0
for each good j ∈ G, and ui(x) = ∑j∈G uijxij. As a generalization, we consider spending constraint
utilities [22], where the utility derived by agent i from good j is given by a piecewise linear concave (PLC)
function fij . The overall utility of agent i is additively separable among goods, i.e., ui(x) =
∑
j∈G fij(xij).
Each fij is a PLC function with a number of linear segments. Each segment k has two parameters: the
rate of utility uijk per unit of good derived on segment k and the maximum fraction Bijk of budget that
can be spent on segment k. All Bijk are strictly positive, and concavity implies uijk > uij(k+1). Here we
assume all uijk’s are integers, all Bijk, wij ’s are rational numbers and the whole input can be represented
in no more than L bits. Markets with spending constraint utilities have an equilibrium composed of
rational numbers under mild sufficiency conditions (see Section 3 for details).
More generally, we consider non-decreasing utility functions that generate markets with the weak
gross-substitutes (WGS) property – when we increase a price, the demand for goods with untouched
prices does not strictly decrease. For general WGS markets, we will assume that all demand bundles
of agents are unique. Prominent examples are markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities ui(x) =
∏
x
uij
ij , or
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utilities ui(x) =
(∑
j∈G uijx
ρ
ij
)1/ρ
with 0 < ρ < 1. Note that
even if all utility and endowment parameters are rationals of finite size, then demand bundles and the
market equilibrium in such markets might involve irrational numbers. In this case, we are interested in
approximate market equilibria, and our prices will use a prespecified precision depending on the desired
approximation factor.
Oracles Our algorithm queries demands for the agents by publishing prices p. Then an oracle returns
the total demand xj for each good j ∈ G. It assumes each agent can sell his initial endowment at the
given prices and then requests a utility-maximizing bundle of goods for the money he has available. For
ease of notation, given any price vector p, let O(p) denote the surplus vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) for the
return of the oracle, where sj = pjzj is the surplus (in terms of money) of good j ∈ G. In other words,
assuming we publish p, the oracle returns an excess demand vector z = (z1, . . . , zm), then
4 O(p) = p · z.
In general WGS markets the surplus vector might contain irrational values. Thus, we use an approx-
imate demand oracle O˜(p, µ), which is a blackbox algorithm that takes any price vector p and positive
rational µ as input. It returns a surplus vector s such that |si −O(p)| ≤ µ holds for every good i. Note
that for many WGS markets the demand oracle can be implemented very quickly – for CES utilities there
are even closed-form expressions for the demand of each agent for each good as a function of prices, utility
4We define the surplus vector as price times excess demand since it satisfies
∑
i
si = 0. This invariant is useful in design
and analysis of our algorithms below.
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and endowment. More generally, we assume that the oracle can be implemented in time polynomial in
the input size and log(1/µ). This standard assumption for demand oracles has also been used in previous
work [13,14].
In linear and spending constraint markets, a major challenge for an algorithm in unknown markets is
non-uniqueness of demands. Here an oracle needs to do tie-breaking between several different bundles of
goods that yield the same maximum utility for an agent. Ideally, it should satisfy the following properties:
(1) The output demand is always deterministic and unique. (2) If p are equilibrium prices, the output
demand equals supply for every good. (3) The oracle can be implemented in time polynomial in the input
size. Based on these criteria, we use a demand oracle that yields demands minimizing the ℓ2-norm of the
surplus vector. More formally, for prices p our oracle returns a set of demand bundles for the agents such
that
∑
i s
2
i is minimized, where si is the surplus of good i. Such a tie-breaking rule was introduced by [21]
and it has been later used in several market algorithms, such as [23,24,42]. This oracle satisfies all three
properties. Furthermore, if utilities, endowments and prices are all given as integers with a number of
bits polynomial in m and L, we can represent every surplus si also with a number of bits polynomial in
m and L. Hence by setting µ sufficiently small, we can convert an approximate demand oracle O˜ into an
exact oracle in polynomial time. Therefore we will assume that in spending constraint markets we are
equipped with an exact demand oracle O instead of an approximate one.
1.2 Results and Contribution
We present simple ascending-price algorithms that converge to market equilibrium in WGS and spending
constraint markets. Our algorithm for WGS markets in Section 2 converges to a (1 + ε)-approximate
equilibrium in time polynomial in m, log(1/ε), and other market parameters. We present the first
algorithm which is not based on the ellipsoid method for this general class of markets. Furthermore,
the number of agents, the agents’ endowment, and utilities all remain unknown. We only query a global
demand oracle that provides aggregate demands for goods at given prices. This information is then
used to increase prices of a selected set of goods whose demand is more than their supply. In Section 2
we ignore for simplicity all precision and representation issues to highlight the general proof technique.
The complete analysis with all details of our algorithm is provided in Appendix A, where we specify
in advance a precision for prices and rely on approximate demand oracles whose output is within our
desired bit precision. One can view our algorithm as a form of tâtonnement. It improves over previous
approaches [13] by exponentially decreasing the dependence of the running time on 1/ε and by working
directly with the unknown market without transformations like adding auxiliary agents.
Next, we apply our approach in Section 3 to spending constraint utilities – a piecewise linear concave
generalization of linear utilities, which has many additional applications due to its natural diminishing
returns property. Since these markets have demands that are non-continuous in the prices, we cannot
directly apply our algorithm or other previous algorithms for WGS markets. Instead, we adjust our
approach to implicitly capture the non-continuity events when using a global demand oracle with suitable
tie-breaking. When all parameters are represented by at most L bits, our algorithm computes even an
exact market equilibrium in time polynomial in m and L. All prices and demands occurring during
the algorithm require a bit precision polynomial in m and L. It first computes a (1 + ε)-approximate
equilibrium using a precision that is polynomial in m, L and log(1/ε). The exact demands returned by
the demand oracle have the same precision. For a small enough ε (using only polynomial bit length), we
can then use a rounding procedure to turn it into a price vector of an exact market equilibrium.
Note that our algorithm requires only access to a suitable demand oracle to compute an approximate
equilibrium. However, in contrast to WGS markets, for spending constraint markets the oracle uses global
tie-breaking. To obtain an exact equilibrium, our final rounding procedure relies on full information about
the utilities. Thus, we obtain in polynomial time an approximate equilibrium in unknown markets (with
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global tie-breaking) and an exact equilibrium with full information. This represents the first polynomial-
time algorithm to compute an exact market equilibrium for spending constraint utilities and settles an
open question raised by [24]. An important open problem is to construct efficient tâtonnement algorithms
that avoid global tie-breaking and full-information rounding.
We use and extend ideas of algorithms for linear markets with full information [21, 24]. These ideas
were also used in spending constraint markets [22] to compute a (1+ ε)-approximate equilibrium in time
polynomial in m, L and 1/ε. Roughly speaking, they are intimately tied to linear and spending constraint
utilities, where they work on the agents’ side and increase prices until structural changes occur in the
optimal bang-per-buck relations. The progress towards equilibrium is measured in the reduction of the
ℓ2-norm of surplus. Our approach works for all WGS markets, in which in general do not exhibit such
structural events that can be used for analysis. This turns out to be much more demanding, and we
develop an approach that works entirely on the goods’ side, based only on prices and aggregate demands
obtained via oracle access.
An issue that plays a central role in our algorithms for spending constraint utilities is precision of
prices and demands. This seems to have been treated only in minor detail in some of the previous works.
For the algorithm of [24] in linear exchange markets these issues are discussed in depth. However, their
solution is to change the agents side and alter utility values for maintaining bounded precision throughout
the algorithm. However, computing an approximate equilibrium in unknown markets with demand oracle
access seems impossible via this route.
As a consequence, unlike for the existing algorithms in the linear case, the surpluses encountered
by our algorithms might now become negative. Hence, additional events have to be taken into account
upon increasing prices. Moreover, a significant challenge lies in maintaining the precision of prices to
be polynomial throughout the algorithm. To overcome this problem, we make use of a novel tool that
we term ratio graph. This graph is defined for a vector of prices p. The goods are the vertices, and
we draw an undirected edge between goods j and k if the ratio of prices pj/pk can be expressed by two
L-bit numbers. For an intuition, observe that if some agent i has the same bang-per-buck for two goods
j and k, then uij/pj = uik/pk or pj/pk = uij/uik, i.e., the ratio of prices can be expressed by two L-bit
numbers. Maybe surprisingly, the broad structure of the ratio graph indeed contains enough information
to implement algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in unknown spending constraint markets.
1.3 Related Work
The problem of computing market equilibria has been intensively studied, and the literature is too vast
to survey here. We provide an overview of the work most directly relevant to ours. There is a large body
of work on algorithms for computing equilibrium using full market information. The first combinatorial
polynomial-time algorithm for linear Fisher markets was given by [21]. Later, [42] provided a polynomial-
time algorithm for Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities by extending combinatorial techniques
of [21]. Strongly polynomial-time algorithms are also known, for Fisher markets with linear [36, 44] and
spending constraint utilities [44].
For linear exchange markets, [32] and [46] obtained polynomial-time algorithms based on ellipsoid and
interior point methods on a convex program, respectively. [24] gave the first combinatorial polynomial-time
algorithm for this problem, which was recently improved by [23]. For exchange markets with spending
constraint utilities, [22] gave an algorithm to compute a (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium, for which the
running time dependence on ǫ is O(1/ǫ2). [26] gave a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for markets
with Cobb-Douglas utilities.
For the general case of WGS markets with unique and continuous demands, a polynomial-time al-
gorithm was obtained by [14]. Note that this algorithm relies heavily on the ellipsoid method. For the
Fisher setting, the famous Eisenberg-Gale convex program [28] captures market equilibrium under linear
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utilities. [27] generalized it to work for any homogeneous utility functions, many of which satisfy the WGS
property.
As an alternative approach to compute market equilibrium, tâtonnement was defined by [45] – al-
gorithms which have access to endowment and utilities only via demand oracles. Usually, tâtonnement
procedures conduct price updates separately for each good, sometimes based on derivatives of the demand
as a function of price. In the computer science literature, [13] gave a discrete tâtonnement process that
converges to an (1+ ǫ)-approximate equilibrium for WGS markets. It has a convergence time polynomial
in the input size and 1/ǫ, and it does not query the original market since one needs to add auxiliary
agents. By taking a different approach, our algorithm for the same market setting improves this rate
to polynomial in the input size and log(1/ǫ). Also, we only rely on approximate demand queries to the
original market.
More recently, [16] established the first fast converging discrete version of tâtonnement for WGS
markets. The convergence time depends on various market parameters. It requires a non-zero amount
of money in the market, so it works for the special case of Fisher markets and beyond, but it is not
applicable to the full range of exchange markets. For Fisher markets, many additional results [3, 4, 9–11]
on the convergence of tâtonnement processes beyond WGS markets were derived.
2 WGS Exchange Markets
In this section we describe the algorithm for WGS exchange markets. As previously mentioned, we
assume that we are only granted access to an approximate demand oracle and are restricted to finite
precision arithmetic computations. In order to make our algorithm and its analysis more accessible, we
will simplify the problem in the remainder of this section by assuming that we are equipped with (1)
exact real arithmetic, and (2) an exact demand oracle. This significantly simplifies the analysis in terms
of notation and calculations, and as such concentrates on the key ideas of the algorithm. A complete and
rigorous version of this section, presenting the entire algorithm and its proof with approximate precision,
can be found in Appendix A.
We apply algorithm Alg-WGS-Precise given below. The main idea is to repeatedly identify a
subset of goods G1 by finding a gap in the sorted order of surpluses. It then raises the prices of G1 by
a common factor x until the surplus gap is almost closed, or the smallest surplus of G1 becomes (close
to) 0. More formally, given price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm), value x ∈ R+ and subset S ⊆ G, the algorithm
uses Update(p, x, S), which is the price vector p′ = (p′1, . . . , p′m) with p′i = x · pi if i ∈ S and p′i = pi
otherwise. To implement this process, the algorithm relies on two parameters D1 and D2 based on the
following assumptions.
Assumption 2.1 (Bounded Price). There exists a market equilibrium (p∗,x∗) with 1 ≤ p∗i ≤ 2D1 ,∀i ∈ G.
Assumption 2.2 (Continuity). For any price vector p such that 1 ≤ pi ≤ 2D1 for each i, | ∂si∂pj | < 2D2
for every i, j, where si is the surplus money of good i in O(p), and D2 is a polynomial of the input size.
These two assumptions are precisely the ones from [13, 14]. Assumption 2.1 about bounded prices
is fairly mild and in many cases necessary for an efficient algorithm to compute a (strong) approximate
market equilibrium. Assumption 2.2 about continuity is also satisfied by many natural markets, for
example, markets with CES utilities with 0 < ρ < 1. Note, however, that it is not satisfied for linear and
spending constraint markets, and hence we must develop new tools and procedures in Section 3.
To measure progress towards equilibrium we use a potential function Φ(pt) = ‖O(pt)‖2. We start by
proving a number of claims about the price vector pt. The first claim shows that with respect to exact
demands, our algorithm monotonically reduces the 1-norm of the surpluses of all goods from 2m.
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Algorithm 1. Alg-WGS-Precise
Input : number of goods m, demand oracle O, precision bound ε > 0
Output: Prices p of an (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium
1 Set initial price p0 ← (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t← 0.
2 repeat //round t
3 t← t+ 1
4 s = (s1, . . . , sm)← O(pt−1)
5 Sort s such that si1 ≥ si2 ≥ · · · ≥ sim .
6 Find smallest k, such that sik+1 ≤ 0 or sik > (1 + 1m)sik+1.
7 Set G1 ← {i1, . . . , ik} and G2 ← G \G1
8 Find the largest x, such that in s′ = O(Update(pt−1, x,G1)) it holds
min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = max{{s′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {0}}.
9 pt ← Update(pt−1, x,G1)
10 until ‖O(pt)‖2 < ε2
11 return pt
Claim 2.1. In Alg-WGS-Precise, |O(p0)| ≤ 2m and |O(pt)| is non-increasing in t.
Proof. Let di be the exact demand for good i under price p0, then |O(p0)| =
∑
i |di−1| ≤
∑
i di+m = 2m.
Next, by the criteria to define G1 and G2 in each round, we have {i | O(pt−1)i < 0} ⊆ G2.
During round t, only prices of goods in G1 are increased. By the WGS property, we know O(pt)i ≥
O(pt−1)i for every i ∈ G2. Further, note that min{O(pt)i | i ∈ G1} ≥ 0 since min{O(pt)i | i ∈ G1} ≥ 0.
Hence, we do not introduce any new negative surplus in O(pt). Thus, we have
|O(pt−1)| = −2
∑
O(pt−1)i<0
O(pt−1)i ≥ −2
∑
O(pt)i<0
O(pt−1)i ≥ −2
∑
O(pt)i<0
O(pt)i = |O(pt)| .
The next two claims bound the range of prices we encounter, which is important for showing that we
approach the unique market equilibrium.
Claim 2.2. Throughout the run of Alg-WGS-Precise, every good with negative surplus has price 1.
Hence, there will be at least one good whose price remains 1.
Proof. Observe the following three simple facts about the surplus O(pt) resulting from exact demands:
(1) Throughout the algorithm we never increase the price of any good with negative surplus. (2) The
surplus of any good does not change from non-negative to negative. (3) For any non-equilibrium price
vector, there will always be a good with negative surplus. These facts are direct consequences of the
conditions used to classify goods based on O(pt) in the algorithm. Together they prove the claim.
Claim 2.3. In Alg-WGS-Precise, for any t ≥ 0, all prices in pt are bounded by 2D1 .
Proof. Let p∗ be equilibrium prices according to Assumption 2.1. We show that for any t ≥ 0, pt is always
pointwise smaller than p∗. Assume that this is not true, let t be the smallest value such that there exists
(pt)i > p
∗
i for some i. Note that according to the algorithm, we have pt = Update(pt−1, x,G1) for some
x > 1 and G1 ⊆ [m]. Further, by our classification based on O, it is easy to see that O(pt)i > 0 for any
i ∈ G1. This means from pt−1 to pt, only prices of goods in G1 are increased. Let S = {i | (pt)i > p∗i },
then we have S ⊆ G1.
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Next, we apply a sequence of price changes to pt. First, for every j /∈ S we increase (pt)j to p∗j . Let
p be the new price vector and consider the surplus O(p) resulting from exact demands. By the WGS
property of the market, the surplus of any good in S will not decrease, hence we still have O(p)i > 0 for
every i ∈ S. The sum of all surpluses in an exchange market is always 0, so ∑j /∈S O(p)j < 0.
Now we decrease the price of every good i ∈ S from pi to p∗i . Then p becomes exactly p∗. This
process will not increase surplus of any good j 6∈ S. Thus we still have∑j /∈S O(p∗)j < 0. This contradicts
the assumption that p∗ are prices of a market equilibrium.
The following claim establishes a relation between the surplus of a good with respect to exact demands
before and after a multiplicative price update step.
Claim 2.4. For any price vector p, x > 1 and S ⊆ [m], O(Update(p, x, S))i ≤ x · O(p)i for any i ∈ S.
Proof. Because prices are scalable in exchange markets, we have O(x ·p) = x · O(p) for any value x > 0.
Also, by the WGS property, when we decrease any set of prices, this will not increase the demand for goods
with untouched price. Since these goods have untouched price and non-decreasing demand, they also enjoy
non-decreasing surplus. Therefore for any i ∈ S, we have O(Update(p, x, S))i ≤ O(x·p)i = x·O(p)i.
The next lemma is the key step in the proof of our main result. It establishes a multiplicative decrease
of the potential function at the end of many of the rounds. Let R be a sufficiently large constant to be
explained in the end of the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. If x < 1+ 1
Rm3
at the end of round t in Alg-WGS-Precise, then Φ(pt) ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
.
Proof. We let s = O(pt−1) and s′ = O(pt) throughout the proof. An intuition of the proof is as follows.
In Alg-WGS-Precise, by the conditions used to define G1 and G2, we always have sik ≥ si1/e and
sik − sik+1 > sik/(m+1) ≥ si1/e(m+1). Hence, roughly speaking, every good in G1 has reasonably large
surplus, and there is a reasonably large gap between the surpluses in G1 and G2. Next, at the end of the
current round, we decreased the minimum surplus of a good in G1 to either min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = 0 (Case
(1) below) or min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = max{s′i | i ∈ G2} (Case (2) below). In both cases, the total value of Φ
must decrease by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m3).
More formally, if the algorithm proceeds to round t, then ‖s‖ > ε2. By the definition of set G1, we have
si1 ≤ (1 + 1m)si2 ≤ · · · ≤ (1 + 1m)k−1sik < e · sik . Hence, s2ik > (si1/e)2 ≥ Φ(pt−1)/(me2) > (ε/(
√
me))2,
so the surpluses of goods in G1 are similar up to a factor of e and bounded from below. Also we have
(sik − sik+1)2 > (si1/e(m+ 1))2 ≥ Φ(pt−1)/(e2(m+ 1)2m).
Next we relate the surplus in the beginning and the end of a round as follows. For every i ∈ G1,
by Claim 2.4, the surplus from exact demands satisfies s′i ≤ x · si. Since x < 1 + 1Rm3 , it holds that
s′i < (1 +
1
Rm3 )si. We do not touch the price of any good j ∈ G2, so the WGS property implies for exact
demands s′j ≥ sj.
Now, in order to bound the change of Φ(pt), we consider s
′ according to G1 and G2. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: max{s′i | i ∈ G2} < 0 In this case the algorithm has decreased the surplus of some good in
G1 to 0. This decrease alone brings down the potential function Φ by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m). All other
surpluses will cause an increase by a factor of at most 1 +O(1/m3).
More formally, the contribution of goods of G1 to Φ(pt) can be upper bounded by
k∑
j=1
s′2ij <
k−1∑
j=1
(
1 +
1
Rm3
)2
s2ij .
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Furthermore, for every i ∈ G2, by the WGS property of the market, we know si ≤ s′i < 0. Thus the
contribution of goods of G2 to Φ(pt) can be upper bounded by
m∑
j=k+1
s′2ij ≤
m∑
j=k+1
s2ij <
m∑
j=k+1
(
1 +
1
Rm3
)2
s2ij
Combining the two parts
Φ(pt) =
m∑
j=1
s′2ij <
∑
j 6=k
(
1 +
1
Rm3
)2
s2ij
=
(
1 +
1
Rm3
)2
(Φ(pt−1)− s2ik)
<
(
1 +
1
Rm3
)2(
1− 1
e2m
)
Φ(pt−1)
<
(
1− 1
2e2m
)
Φ(pt−1)
where the last inequality holds for any m ≥ 2 with sufficiently large constant R.
Case 2: max{s′i | i ∈ G2} ≥ 0 In this case the gap between surpluses in G1 and G2 decreases to 0.
Below we show that the closing of this gap yields a decrease of the potential function Φ by a factor of
1 − Ω(1/m3). All other surpluses will increase by a factor of at most 1 + O(1/m3). In combination, it
turns out that Φ will decrease by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m3).
More formally, in this case min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = max{s′j | j ∈ G2}. Let sG1 = min{s′i | i ∈ G1} and
sG2 = max{s′j | j ∈ G2}. For every i ∈ G1, let s′i = x′si − δi where x′ = (1 + 1Rm3 ), and for every j ∈ G2,
let s′j = sj + δj . Hence δi, δj ≥ 0 for all i, j. Further, we have
∑m
i=1 si =
∑m
i=1 s
′
i = 0, hence∑
i∈G1
δi =
∑
i∈G1
x′si −
∑
i∈G1
s′i
≥
∑
i∈G1
si +
∑
j∈G2
s′j =
∑
i∈G1
si +
∑
j∈G2
(sj + δj)
=
∑
j∈G2
δj
and
∑
i∈G1
δi ≥ 1
2
(sik − sik+1).
Now we have
Φ(pt) =
∑
i
s′2i =
∑
i∈G1
(x′si − δi)2 +
∑
j∈G2
(sj + δj)
2
=
∑
i∈G1
x′2s2i +
∑
j∈G2
s2j
+
∑
j∈G2
δj(sj + δj)−
∑
i∈G1
δi(x
′si − δi)
− ∑
i∈G1
x′siδi +
∑
j∈G2
δjsj (1)
< x′2Φ(pt−1) +
sG2 ∑
j∈G2
δj − sG1
∑
i∈G1
δi
− sik ∑
i∈G1
δi + sik+1
∑
j∈G2
δj (2)
< x′2Φ(pt−1)− (sik − sik+1)
∑
i∈G1
δi (3)
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< x′2Φ(pt−1)− 1
2
(sik − sik+1)2 (4)
<
(
1 +
2
Rm3
+
1
R2m6
− 1
2e2(m+ 1)2m
)
Φ(pt−1) (5)
=
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
Φ(pt−1) (6)
Here (1) can be derived by expanding the quadratic formula and appropriately reorganizing the terms.
For the step from (1) to (2), in the first bracket we overestimate the quadratic terms of s into x′2Φ(pt−1).
In the second bracket, the terms are bounded correctly using sG1 for all i ∈ G1 and sG2 for all j ∈ G2. For
the final two terms in (1) and (2) we use the definition of sik and sik+1 and the fact that x
′ > 1. For the
step from (2) to (3), for the second bracket of (2) we note sG1 ≥ sG2 and the two sets G1 and G2 have the
same sums of δ-terms. By the same argument, we can transform the last two terms of (2) as shown. From
(3) to (4) and then to (5), we use the bound for
∑
i∈G1 δi and (sik − sik+1)2 > Φ(pt−1)/(e2(m+ 1)2m) as
shown above.
Finally, using a sufficiently large constant R, the multiplicative term in (5) can be decreased to
strictly less than 1 for every m ≥ 2. The final expression in (6) captures the asymptotics and proves the
lemma.
Observe that the previous lemma shows a decrease in the potential only for rounds in which the factor
x is rather small. The next lemma shows that there can be only a limited number of rounds with a larger
value of x.
Lemma 2.2. During a run of Alg-WGS-Precise, there can be only O(m4D1) many rounds that end
with x ≥ 1 + 1
Rm3
.
Proof. By Claim 2.3, every price can be increased by a factor of 1 + 1Rm3 at most O(log1+1/Rm3 2
D1) =
O(m3D1) times. Hence there can be at most O(m
4D1) many rounds with x ≥ 1 + 1Rm3 .
Finally, we can assemble the properties to show the number of rounds to reach an (1+ε)-approximate
market equilibrium is polynomially bounded.
Lemma 2.3. For any market that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, and for any ε > 0, Alg-WGS-
Precise returns the price vector of an (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium in a number of rounds
polynomial in the input size and log(1/ε).
Proof. Let xt be the value of x we find in round t of Alg-WGS-Precise. First because at least one
price will increase by a factor of xt in round t, by Claim 2.3 we have
∏
t xt ≤ 2mD1 . At the end of
round t, if xt ≥ 1 + 1Rm3 , let s = max{si | si ∈ O(pt−1)} and s′ = max{si | si ∈ O(pt)}, then by
Claim 2.4 we have Φ(pt) ≤ ms′2 ≤ mx2t s2 ≤ mx2tΦ(pt−1). Moreover, by Lemma 2.2 there will be at most
O(m4D1) such rounds. Hence the total increase of Φ(pt) in these rounds will be no more than a factor
of
∏
xt≥1+1/Rm3 mx
2
t ≤ mO(m
4D1)22mD1 = mO(m
4D1).
For all other rounds, we have x < 1+ 1Rm3 , and by Lemma 2.1, the potential function is decreased by
a factor of 1/(1 − Ω( 1m3 )). Therefore the total number of rounds before Φ(pt) ≤ ε2 will be at most
O
(
log1/(1−Ω( 1
m3
))
mO(m
4D1)
ε2
)
= O
(
D1m
7 logm+m3 log
1
ε
)
10
The final step is to argue that the total running time (in terms of oracle queries) of the algorithm is
polynomial. Given Lemma 2.3, it remains to show that each round only invokes polynomially many oracle
queries. Intuitively, this can be achieved by finding x in line 8 of Alg-WGS-Precise via binary search.
However, for a formal proof it is unavoidable to make statements about the required bit precision of p,
x, and the approximate demand oracle, which we did not discuss here. In the following we present the
statement of the main theorem. The formal proof, together with the statement of algorithm Alg-WGS
based on bounded precision and full details on its analysis, is deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 2.1. For any market that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, and for any ε > 0, Alg-WGS
returns the price vector of an (1+ ε)-approximate market equilibrium in time polynomial in the input size
and log(1/ε).
Remark 2.1. Our main goal in the analysis was to establish a bound on the running time that is
polynomial in m, L, and log(1/ε). For the sake of simplicity we did not optimize the bounds beyond
being polynomial. It appears that the dependence on m can be significantly improved, e.g., by a more
precise analysis of the actual number of rounds with x ≥ 1 + 1Rm3 and their impact on the potential.
Moreover, based on our preliminary experiments, it appears that using µ = Θ(ε/m4) is sufficient, and
the algorithm converges to an equilibrium much faster than the bound predicts.
3 Exchange Markets with Spending Constraint Utilities
In this section we discuss our algorithm for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. Spending
constraint utilities are defined in [22, 42], where the utility derived by agent i from good j is given by a
piecewise linear concave (PLC) function fij. The overall utility of agent i is additively separable among
goods, i.e., ui(x) =
∑
j∈G fij(xij). Each fij is a PLC function with a number of linear segments. Each
segment k has two parameters: the rate of utility uijk per unit of good derived on segment k and the
maximum fraction Bijk of budget that can be spent on segment k. All Bijk are strictly positive, and
concavity implies uijk > uij(k+1). Here we assume all uijk’s are integers, all Bijk, wij ’s are rational
numbers and the whole input can be represented in no more than L bits.
Spending constraint markets may not have an equilibrium [19], however under mild conditions, there
is always a rational equilibrium [35]. Henceforth we will assume the following sufficient condition. Let
Γ(S) = {j ∈ G | wij > 0, i ∈ S}.
Assumption 3.1 (Sufficiency Condition). For any subset S of agents, if Γ(S) 6= G then there exists
i ∈ S and j ∈ G \ Γ(S) such that uij1 > 0.
Let us first characterize the demand of each agent i under spending constraint utilities. Given nonzero
prices p, define the bang-per-buck relative to p for segment k in fij to be uijk/pj . Sort all segments of
agent i by decreasing bang-per-buck value, and partition them by equality into classes: Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt.
Then an allocation is a demand bundle of agent i if and only if there is an integer ti such that all
segments in partitions Q1, . . . , Qti−1 are all fully allocated, and no segments in partitions Qti+1, Qti+2, . . .
are allocated. Furthermore, the total money spent on partitions Q1, . . . , Qti−1 is no more than agent
i’s total budget mi =
∑
j∈G pjwij. We term Qti agent i’s current partition, and Q1, . . . , Qti−1 agent i’s
allocated partition. Let spentai denote the total money of agent i spent on allocated segments, and let
spentgj denote the total money spent on allocated segments of good j. Agent i can freely demand any
segments in her current partition, fully or partially, until her remaining budget mi− spentai is exhausted.
Equality and Ratio Graph The main tool for the analysis of previous algorithms in spending con-
straint markets is an equality graph, denoted by EG(p). This graph remains completely unknown to
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our algorithm, but it proves useful when proving properties of the convergence process. The vertex set
of this bipartite graph consists of the set of agents A and the set of goods G. Given a price vector pt,
we introduce an edge from agent i to good j if and only if agent i’s current partition Qti contains one
segment that belongs to utility function fij for good j. The edges in EG(p) are called equality edges.
Observe that this graph changes throughout the process when we update the price vector pt.
Based on EG(p) we can construct an equality network denoted by N(p): First for each edge in
EG(p) from agent i to good j, let k be the corresponding segment for fij that belongs to Qti . We assign
a capacity of cij = Bijkmi to this edge. Next add a source vertex s and a sink vertex t. For each agent i,
add an edge from s to i with capacity mi−spentai , and finally add an edge from every good to sink t with
infinite capacity. It is easy to see that every maximum flow in N(p) corresponds to a feasible demand
allocation for each agent.
Similar to [21], we define a balanced flow as a maximum flow in N(p) that minimizes
∑
j∈G(ℓjt +
spentgj − pj)2, where ℓjt is the flow along edge (j, t), which also denotes the money spent on good j on
segments of current partitions, and spentgj is the amount of money spent on allocated partitions of good j.
By assumption, O(p) returns the surplus vector derived from (any) balanced flow of the network N(p)5.
As mentioned above, our algorithm cannot see EG(p). We use a different structure that can be
observed on the goods side.
Definition 3.1. The ratio graph RG(M,p) is an undirected graph with m vertices (where m is the
number of goods in the market), and for any two goods i and j, (i, j) is an edge if and only if pi/pj can
be represented as a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2M − 1.
We can compute the ratio graph using only the price vector and the input size bound. It allows us to
retrieve some information about the hidden structure of EG(p).
Claim 3.1. Let L be the upper bound on the number of bits to represent each utility parameter and p
be a price vector. For any price vector p and goods i, j that are connected in EG(p), i and j are also
connected in RG(M,p) for any M ≥ L.
Proof. If good i and good j are connected in EG(p), then there exist goods i = i0, i1, . . . , ik−1, ik = j,
such that for each t < k, there exists some agent at that has the same bang-per-buck for two segments
for goods it and it+1, respectively. Then we have pit/pit+1 = uatitk1/uatit+1k2 for some k1 and k2. This is
a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2L − 1. This implies (it, it+1) ∈ RG(M,p), so i and j are
connected in RG(M,p).
There exists an algorithm for computing exact equilibrium prices in Fisher markets with spending
constraint utilities [42]. [22] give an FPTAS for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. The
algorithm finds an (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
For spending constraint markets, we extend our approach for WGS markets. The challenge is that
surplus can change in a non-continuous way when prices change the current partitions of the agents.
However, we show how to use the linear structure of the market to get rough information about these
breakpoints. Also, we maintain prices within a polynomial precision and guarantee convergence to an
approximate market equilibrium. Finally, when Φ(p) becomes small enough, we convert the approximate
equilibrium to an exact one using a procedure Alg-Spending-Exact.
Our only assumption is that the whole input can be represented within L bits, and L is known
to the algorithm. This implies as a corollary a variant of Assumption 2.1 – there is an exact market
equilibrium with prices p s.t. maxi pimini pi ≤ 2D1 where D1 is a polynomial of m and L. As mentioned before,
Assumption 2.2 does not hold in spending constraint markets.
5It can be easily shown that every balanced flow gives the same surplus vector.
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Algorithm 2. Alg-Spending: Framework for Spending Constraint Markets
Input : number of goods m, demand oracle O, number of bits L to represent the whole input
(including each uijk, Bijk, wij); solution precision ε
Output: Prices p of a (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium
Parameters: ε′ = ε
2
√
m
1 Set initial price p0 ← (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t← 0.
2 repeat //round t
3 t← t+ 1
4 s = (s1, . . . , sm)← O(pt−1)
5 Sort s such that si1 ≥ si2 ≥ · · · ≥ sim .
6 Find smallest k, such that sik+1 ≤ 0 or sik > (1 + 1m)sik+1.
7 Set G1 ← {i1, . . . , ik} and G2 ← [m]\G1
8 Binary search the smallest x ∈ (1,∞), such that in s′ = O(Update(pt−1, x,G1)) it holds
min{s′i | i ∈ G1} ≤ max{{s′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {0}}.
9 pt ← Update(pt−1, x,G1)
10 until ‖O(pt)‖2 < ε′2
11 return pt
3.1 The Framework
Alg-Spending specifies the general framework of our algorithm, which is similar to the approach taken
previously for WGS markets. As mentioned in Section 1.1, here we do not resort to approximation
parameter µ, but instead compute the exact surplus. We first analyze Alg-Spending and show that
it needs only a polynomial number of rounds to converge to an approximate market equilibrium. For
now, our analysis disregards all precision and representation issues. In particular, we assume to find the
exact value x using binary search, irrespective of the number of bits needed for representation. Also, the
update of prices from pt−1 to pt will multiply all prices of goods in G1 by x, irrespective of the number
of bits required to represent them. In our final algorithm below, we will show how to address these issues
to obtain a (true) polynomial-time algorithm.
The analysis of Alg-Spending proceeds roughly as in the previous section. We rely on the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.1. The demands returned by O(p) satisfy the WGS property.
Proof. We make use of a max-min fair property for balanced flows in linear markets proved in previous
work. A vector s is called max-min fair iff for every feasible vector s′ and i such that si < s′i, there is
some j with sj < si, such that sj > s
′
j. The following claim is proved by [21].
Claim 3.2. [21] The surplus vector of a balanced flow in N(G) is max-min fair among all feasible surplus
vectors.
Although this claim is for linear markets, it can also be directly applied to spending constraint markets
because the network flows are designed only with respect to the current partition of each agent i. Within
this domain the spending constraint market behaves exactly like a linear market.
We proceed to prove Lemma 3.1 by contradiction to this claim. Suppose we increase the price of
some good k from pk to pk + δ. We denote the old prices by p and the new prices by p
′. Let s = O(p)
and s′ = O(p′). Now assume for contradiction that there exists some ℓ 6= k such that s′ℓ < sℓ. Let
SG = {j ∈ G | sj ≥ sℓ, j 6= k} and SA = {i ∈ A | there exists j ∈ SG such that fij > 0 in N(p)}. It is
easy to verify the following properties.
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(a) For any edge (i, j) in N(p) with j 6= k, let seg be the segment in agent i’s current partition that
corresponds to this edge. Then with new prices p′, either seg belongs to the allocated partition
(i.e., is fully allocated), or seg is still in agent i’s current partition (i.e., (i, j) also exists in N(p′)).
(b) For any edge (i, j) ∈ N(p′) with i ∈ SA and j 6∈ SG, let seg be the segment in agent i’s current
partition that corresponds to this edge with prices p′. If seg is also in i’s current partition with
prices p, then seg is fully allocated with price p (otherwise agent i can reroute some flow from SG
to this segment to obtain a more balanced flow in N(p)). If seg is not in i’s current partition with
price p, then all segments in i’s current partition with price p must be fully allocated in the demand
allocation with prices p′.
The above two observations imply that with prices p′, we can rearrange flows from SA to SG to get a
new feasible surplus vector s′′ such that for all j ∈ SG, s′′j ≥ sj , and for all other edges j /∈ SG, s′′j = s′j .
In particular, we have s′′j ≥ sj ≥ sℓ > s′ℓ for all j ∈ SG. This contradicts the fact that s′ is max-min fair
and proves Lemma 3.1.
Now the following properties can be proved using literally the same proofs as for WGS markets before.
Claim 3.3. For Alg-Spending the following properties hold.
1. In Alg-Spending, |O(p0)| ≤ 2m, and |O(pt)| is non-increasing in t.
2. For any price vector p, x > 1, and S ⊆ [m] it holds O(Update(p, x, S))i ≤ x ·O(p)i for any i ∈ S.
3. The number of rounds that end with x ≥ 1+ 1
Rm3
in Alg-Spending is O(m4D1), for a sufficiently
large constant R.
We also show a version of Claim 2.2 for spending constraint markets, which needs some extra work.
Unlike for WGS markets, the surplus of a good can change from non-negative to negative. Thus, the
proof of Claim 2.2 does not directly transfer to spending constraint markets. Instead, we first show the
following.
Claim 3.4. Let St be the set of goods with negative surplus and price strictly greater than 1 at the end
of round t in Alg-Spending. For any T ⊆ St, let Γ(T,pt) be the neighbors of set T in EG(pt), i.e.,
Γ(T,pt) is the set of agents who are interested in at least one good in T under price pt. Let B(Γ(T,pt))
be the sum of budgets of agents in Γ(T,pt). Then we have B(Γ(T,pt)) >
∑
i∈T (pt)i.
Proof. We prove this claim by induction. The claim is trivially true for round 0. Assume that it is true
for any round t ≤ t′, then at the end of round t = t′ + 1, consider two cases:
• min{s′i | i ∈ G1} ≥ 0. Because the surplus of any good in G2 is non-decreasing in round t, we
have St ⊆ St−1. Further, the algorithm does not increase the price of any good in T in round t.
Hence, we also have Γ(T,pt−1) ⊆ Γ(T,pt). By the induction assumption, we have B(Γ(T,pt)) ≥
B(Γ(T,pt−1)) >
∑
i∈T (pt−1)i =
∑
i∈T (pt)i.
• min{s′i | i ∈ G1} < 0. Assume that during this round we start from x = 1 and increase x continu-
ously until it reaches its final value. We also assume that the equality graphEG(Update(pt−1, x,G1))
and the corresponding balanced flow are implicitly being maintained throughout the process. For
each agent i and any moment during this round, let Γ(i) denote the neighbors of agent i in the
equality graph. There are two cases:
14
Case (a): Γ(i) ∩ G1 6= ∅ and Γ(i) ∩ G2 6= ∅. This means agent i’s current partition contains
segments of goods in both G1 and G2. When we continue to increase x (and consequently the prices
of goods in G1), the segments of goods in G1 will have worse bang-per-buck value than segments
of goods in G2. Hence, they will be removed from agent i’s current partition. Furthermore, for any
good j1 ∈ Γ(i)∩G1 and j2 ∈ Γ(i)∩G2, because we have sj1 > sj2 and the balanced flow condition,
it cannot happen that ℓij1 > 0 and ℓij2 < cij2 . Otherwise agent i would be able to route some flow
from edge (i, j1) to edge (i, j2) to reach a more balanced flow. Thus, two possibilities remain:
– ℓij2 = cij2 for every j2 ∈ Γ(i) ∩G2. This means all segments of goods in G2 are already fully
allocated. When x increases, the new current partition of agent i will only contain segments
of goods in Γ(i) ∩G1, and the surpluses will change continuously with the change of x.
– ℓij1 = 0 for every j1 ∈ Γ(i) ∩ G1. This means when x increases, the segments that are being
removed from i’s current partition are all unallocated in the current allocation. Hence, the
surpluses will again change continuously at the current point.
In summary, in this case the change of the surpluses will always be continuous in the change of
x. Note that when the surpluses are changing continuously, Case 2 cannot occur before Case 1
happens. Therefore, the Claim follows via Case 1.
Case (b): Γ(i) ⊆ G1 or Γ(i) ⊆ G2. This means we will always change the prices of all segments
in i’s current partition by the same rate. Hence, if set Qti changes, it can only be merged with some
segments in Qti−1 or Qti+1. In either case, the final value of x must be at a point where at least one
new edge emerges in the equality graph EG(pt) from Γ(G1) ⊆ A (the set of agents incident to at
least one good in G1) to G2. Suppose we alter the equality graph by removing these emerging edges
from EG(pt). If we recompute the balanced flow, then min{s′i | i ∈ G1} > max{{s′i | i ∈ G2}∪{0}}.
For any T ⊆ St, let T1 = T ∩G1 and T2 = T ∩G2. In this new graph, let Γ′(T1) be the set of agents
who have positive flow to at least one good in T1, and let Γ
′(T2) be the set of agents incident to at
least one good in T2. Since min{s′i | i ∈ T1} > max{s′i | i ∈ T2}, by the balanced flow condition
we know Γ′(T1) ∩ Γ′(T2) = ∅. Also, we have B(Γ′(T1)) > ∑i∈T1(pt)i because every good in T1 has
positive surplus, and B(Γ′(T2)) >
∑
i∈T2(pt)i because the claim is true in round t− 1. Combining
these two inequalities gives us B(Γ(T,pt)) >
∑
i∈T (pt)i.
Corollary 3.1. At the end of each round t in Alg-Spending, for any good i with negative surplus and
price greater than 1, there exists another good j with price 1 that is connected to i in EG(pt)
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the statement is false. Let T be the set of goods with negative
surplus and connected with good i in EG(pt). By the balanced flow condition, none of the agents in
Γ(T,pt) can have any positive flow to goods outside set T . Thus we have 0 >
∑
i∈T s′i = B(Γ(T,pt)) −∑
i∈T (pt)i. This contradicts Claim 3.4.
We obtain the following corollary, an analog of Claim 2.2 for spending constraint markets.
Corollary 3.2. Throughout the run of Alg-Spending, there will be at least one good whose price
remains 1.
The set of properties shown so far allows to establish the following lemma, which is the key step
for observing convergence to equilibrium. It can be seen as an adjustment of Lemma 2.1 to spending
constraint markets. As before, it involves a sufficiently large constant R.
15
Algorithm 3. Rounding (p,M): Rounding procedure
Input : price vector p in which mini pi = 1, rounding bound M ≥ L
Output: Rounded price vector p′
1 Let P = {ab | a, b ∈ Z+, a, b ≤ 2M} and p′ ← p.
2 while RG(M,p′) is not connected do
3 Let C1, C2, . . . , Ck be the connected components of RG(M,p
′)
4 Assume without loss of generality that C1 is a component with mini∈C1∩A p′i = 1
5 For every i, j, let rij = p
′
i/p
′
j .
6 Let bij = min{ xrij | x ∈ P, x ≥ rij} and Bij = min{bi′j′ | i′ ∈ Ci, j′ ∈ Cj}.
7 Let (i, j) ∈ argmini>j Bij.
8 p′ ← Update(p′, Bij , Ci)
9 return p′
Lemma 3.2. If x < (1+ 1
Rm3
) at the end of round t in Alg-Spending, then Φ(pt) ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1−Ω
(
1
m3
))
.
Proof. Our proof uses the arguments of the proof for Lemma 2.1. We consider two cases:
Case 1: min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = max{{s′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {0}} This case can be verified by observing that
Claim A.4 holds with µ = 0. Then the proof follows using exactly the same proof as for Lemma 2.1.
Case 2: min{s′i | i ∈ G1} < max{{s′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {0}} Using the same argument as in the proof of
Claim 3.4, one can show that in this case x must be at a point where at least one new edge emerges
in the equality graph EG(pt) from Γ(G1) ⊆ A. Without these emerging edges, we have min{s′i | i ∈
G1} ≥ max{s′i | i ∈ G2}. This means that we can further reduce the flows along the new edges to get
another feasible flow in N(pt), such that with the resulting surplus vector s
′′ we have min{s′′i | i ∈ G1} =
max{s′′i | i ∈ G2}.
Next, using again the same proof as for Lemma 2.1, for a sufficiently large constant R it follows that
‖s′′‖2 ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
. Hence, Φ(pt) ≤ ‖s′′‖2 ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
.
3.2 Precision and Representation
It is now tempting to think that using a similar argument as in the general WGS case, Claim 3.3,
Corollary 3.2 and Lemma 3.2 provide an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium
in polynomial time. However, an issue arises with regard to the precision and representation of the
prices: In each round, x could potentially be a rational number involving prices and surpluses, and after
multiplying each price in G1 by x, the bit length to represent a price can double in one round. This means
that after a polynomial number of rounds, we may require an exponential number of bits to represent the
prices of some goods as well as the desired factor x.
Recall the ratio graph and Claim 3.1. As an adjustment, we run the following procedureRounding(p,M)
at the end of each iteration of the main loop in Alg-Spending. Its purpose is to round the prices within
polynomial bit length while maintaining the structure of equality and ratio graphs. Thereby, we will show
that the value of potential function Φ(p) will not be increased dramatically.
Our new algorithm Alg-Spending-Rounding is simply the framework Alg-Spending with the
following modifications:
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(1) Set M = log2
5m7
ε′2 . In each round, binary search x within domain P = {ab | a > b, a, b ∈ Z+, a, b ≤
22mM+L}, instead of (1,∞).
(2) At the end of each round t, update pt ← Rounding(pt,M) with M as above.
Lemma 3.3. Given any price vector p, Rounding(p,M) terminates in time polynomial in m,M . The
returned price vector p′ satisfies:
(a) there exists i ∈ G with pi = p′i = 1,
(b) every price can be represented as a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2mM ,
(c) EG(p′) contains every edge present in EG(p), and
(d) pi ≤ p′i ≤ pi + 2−M for every i ∈ G.
Proof. Property (a) holds since we never increase the price of goods in set C1, and property (b) can be
derived based on property (a) and the fact that RG(M,p′) is connected when the algorithm terminates.
Next we claim that for any i, j, there does not exist any x ∈ P, such that pi/pj ≤ x < p′i/p′j . This
is because by design, pi/pj has to reach x in some iteration before it grows beyond x. But starting from
that moment until the end of the algorithm, i and j will be connected in RG(M,p). The ratios between
two prices in the same connected component in RG(M,p) remain unchanged. Hence pi/pj will never
grow beyond x.
This claim also proves property (c). By Claim 3.1, a pair of goods i and j connected in EG(p) remain
connected in RG(M,p). Hence, their ratio of prices will remain the same in p′, and they are connected
in EG(p′).
For property (d), according to the algorithm no price will decrease from p to p′. Next, number the
goods such that p1 = p
′
1 = 1. For any i 6= 1, let xi = min{x ∈ P | x ≥ pi}. Then we have p′i/p′1 = p′i ≤ xi,
as well as xi ≤ pi + 2−M . Therefore pi ≤ p′i ≤ pi + 2−M .
Finally, in each iteration we add at least one edge between two connected components in RG(M,p).
Thus the algorithm will terminate after at mostm−1 iterations, and it is easy to check that each iteration
runs in polynomial time. This proves the claim.
Once the prices are bounded by a fixed polynomial bit length, we can also bound the length needed to
encode the desired x in each round. This implies that we can find x in the framework in polynomial time
using binary search.
Lemma 3.4. In every round of Alg-Spending-Rounding, the desired x can be represented as a ratio
of two integers, each of value at most 2mM+L+2 logm − 1.
Proof. Let p = pt−1 and consider the structure of EG(p). We let A1 = Γ(G1) be the agents connected to
goods in G1. Also, let A2 = A \ A1. There is no (i, j) ∈ EG(p) with i ∈ A1 and j ∈ G2, since otherwise
O(pt−1) could increase the money spent on goods in G2 and further decrease Φ(pt−1). For simplicity, we
will also assume that there is no edge (i, j) ∈ A2 × G1, since no agent spends money along these edges
and they immediately disappear once we start increasing prices in G1.
Now we increase p on goods in j ∈ G1 by x and get a new price vector p(x). This only generates new
edges (i, j) ∈ A1 ×G2. Furthermore, we drop only edges (i, j) ∈ A1 ×G1. To verify this let us consider
the other possibilities. The relation between marginal utility values uijk/pj and uij′k′/pj′ for goods in
j, j′ ∈ G1 does not change, since both pj and pk are both multiplied by x. Hence, there are no new edges
(i, j) ∈ A1 × G1. For the same reason, there are no new edges (i, j) ∈ A2 × G2. The bang-per-buck
of goods in G1 decreases, so we also do not introduce edges (i, j) ∈ A2 × G1. In fact, this also implies
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that we do not drop any edges (i, j) ∈ A2 × G2 – prices and bang-per-buck relations among goods in
G2 do not change at all and G2 becomes more attractive compared to G1. Finally, there exist no edges
(i, j) ∈ (A1 × G2) ∪ (A2 × G1) that could be removed. This shows that we only generate new edges
between A1 and G2, and we only drop edges between A1 and G1.
For any given x, consider the residual graph of N(Update(p, x,G1)). Let C be an arbitrary connected
component in this graph. Let CA be the set of agents in C and CG be the set of goods in C. Then we
know that all goods in CG have the same surplus, and all flow going through CG comes from agents in
CA. This implies the following equation:∑
i∈CA\G1
pi + x
∑
i∈CA∩G1
pi =
∑
i∈CG\G1
pi + x
∑
i∈CG∩G1
pi + |CG|s ,
where s is the surplus of (any) good in this component.
Now let us focus on the moment where x reaches the desired value at the end of round t according to
the algorithm. At this moment, one of the following properties must hold:
(1) min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = 0. Then for the connected component that contains a good of surplus 0, we
have s = 0 in the above equation. All initial prices pi are ratios of integers with values at most
2mM , so when we solve the equation for x, the solution is a ratio of two integers with value at most
m2mM = 2mM+logm.
(2) min{s′i | i ∈ G1} = max{s′j | j ∈ G2}. In this case, we have two possibilities:
– There exist two connected components in the residual graph of N(Update(p, x,G1)) that have
the same surplus. Applying the above equation to these two components, we can solve for x,
and the solution will be a ratio of two integers with value at most m22mM = 2mM+2 logm.
– A new edge (i, j) ∈ A1 ×G2 appears, then for agent i good j ∈ G2 becomes equally attractive
as some k ∈ G1: uij/pjx = uik/pk, or, equivalently, x = (uijpk)/(uikpj). pij and pk can be
represented as ratio of integers of value at most 2mM by Lemma 3.3, and uij and uik are both
integers of value at most 2L − 1. Hence, every value of x at which a new edge evolves in
EG(p(x)) can be presented as a ratio of integers of value at most 22mM+L.
We now bound the impact of replacing pt by Rounding(pt,M) in the function Φ(pt).
Lemma 3.5. Φ(Rounding(pt,M)) < Φ(pt) + 5m
32−M for any round t.
Proof. Let p′t = Rounding(pt,M). By Lemma 3.3(c), we know this rounding procedure does not remove
any edges in EG(pt). Let f be a balanced flow in N(pt). Then by Lemma 3.3(d) we can construct a
feasible flow f ′ in N(Rounding(pt,M)), such that fij ≤ f ′ij ≤ fij + 2−M for every i, j. Let s be the
surplus vector derived from f ′, then we have |si −O(pt)i| < m2−M for every i. Hence
‖s‖22 − ‖O(pt)‖22 =
∑
i
(s2i −O(pt)2i )
≤
∑
i
(2m2−M |O(pt)i|+m22−2M )
= 2m22−M |O(pt)|+m32−2M
≤ 4m32−M +m32−2M
< 5m32−M .
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Note that s is just one feasible surplus vector for price vector p′t, and Φ(p′t) minimizes the ℓ2-norm of
surpluses among all feasible surplus vectors. Hence, Φ(Rounding(pt,M)) ≤ ‖s‖22 < ‖O(pt)‖22+5m32−M .
This proves the lemma.
Rounding can be used to obtain an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium
in polynomial time.
Lemma 3.6. For any spending constraint exchange market satisfying Assumption 3.1, an (1 + ε)-
approximate market equilibrium can be computed in time polynomial in m, L, and log(1/ε).
Proof. In the Alg-Spending framework with Alg-Spending-Rounding, we know by Lemma 3.2 that
at the end of each round t and before calling Rounding, Φ(pt) ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
. If Φ(pt) > ε
′2,
we have 5m32−M = ε′2/m4 < Φ(pt)/m4. Thus by Lemma 3.5,
Φ(Rounding(pt,M)) ≤
(
1 +
1
m4
)
Φ(pt)
≤
(
1 +
1
m4
)(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
Φ(pt−1)
=
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
Φ(pt−1)
This implies we can employ the same proof as for Theorem 2.1 to show that after finishing Alg-Spending-
Rounding, we arrive at a (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium. Because M is a polynomial in the
input size and log(1/ε), the binary search and the Rounding procedure run in polynomial time in each
round of the framework. Hence, the running time is polynomial in the input size and log(1/ε).
Finally, it remains to convert the approximate equilibrium to an exact one. To achieve this, we rely
on full information about the spending constraint utilities. While this step can be seen as an extension
of the technique developed in [24] for the linear exchange markets, there are several challenges due to
the much more involved setting of spending constraint utilities, where the allocated partitions make the
remaining budgets of agents and the values of goods dependent on too many parameters. Using a more
involved procedure we are able to handle the extra complexity of the problem. Our result resolves an
open question of [24] of finding an exact polynomial time algorithm for exchange markets with spending
constraint utilities. A detailed discussion of this final step can be found in Appendix B. This yields the
final theorem in this section.
Theorem 3.1. For any spending constraint exchange market satisfying Assumption 3.1, Alg-Spending-
Exact returns the price vector of a market equilibrium in time polynomial in m and L.
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Algorithm 4. Alg-WGS
Input : number of goods m, approximate demand oracle O˜, precision bound ε > 0
Output: Prices p of a (1 + ε)-approximate market equilibrium
Parameters: µ = εR1m7 , ∆ =
1
µ(2
D1+D2+logm), ε′ = ε
2
√
m
1 Set initial price p0 ← (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t← 0.
2 Let P = {ab | a > b, a, b ∈ Z+, a, b ≤ ∆}
3 repeat //round t
4 t← t+ 1
5 s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜m)← O˜(pt−1, µ)
6 Sort s˜ such that s˜i1 ≥ s˜i2 ≥ · · · ≥ s˜im .
7 Find smallest k, such that s˜ik+1 ≤ µ or s˜ik > (1 + 1m)s˜ik+1.
8 Set G1 ← {i1, . . . , ik} and G2 ← G \G1
9 Binary search the largest x ∈ P, such that in s˜′ = O˜(Update(pt−1, x,G1)) it holds
min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≥ max{{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {µ}}.
10 pt ← Update(pt−1, x,G1)
11 until ‖O˜(pt)‖2 < ε′2
12 return pt
A WGS Exchange Markets
In this section we describe the complete algorithm Alg-WGS for WGS exchange markets. Recall the
assumptions from Section 2, which we restate here for completeness.
Assumption 2.1 There exists a market equilibrium (p∗,x∗) with 1 ≤ p∗i ≤ 2D1 ,∀i ∈ G.
Assumption 2.2 For any price vector p such that 1 ≤ pi ≤ 2D1 for each i, | ∂si∂pj | < 2D2 for every i, j,
where si is the surplus money of good i in O(p), and D2 is a polynomial of the input size.
Throughout the analysis and proofs below, if s = O(p) for some p, we use s˜ to denote the surplus
vector returned by the µ-approximation demand oracle with the same price vector, i.e., s˜ = O˜(p, µ). We
proceed along similar lines as in Section 2, and the proofs of the first claims closely resemble the versions
for the exact oracle. For completeness, we provide them here for the approximate oracle.
Claim A.1. In Alg-WGS, |O(p0)| ≤ 2m and |O(pt)| is non-increasing in t.
Proof. Let di be the exact demand for good i under price p0, then |O(p0)| =∑i |di−1| ≤∑i di+m = 2m.
Next, by the criteria to define G1 and G2 in each round, we have {i | O(pt−1)i < 0} ⊆ G2: To see
this, observe that the surplus resulting from the approximate O˜(pt−1) differs by at most an additive
µ = ε/(R1m
7), so a good i with O(pt−1)i < 0 will always be classified in G2 with respect to O˜(pt−1)i.
During round t, only prices of goods in G1 are increased. By the WGS property, we know O(pt)i ≥
O(pt−1)i for every i ∈ G2. Further, note that min{O(pt)i | i ∈ G1} ≥ 0 since min{O˜(pt)i | i ∈ G1} ≥ µ.
Hence, we do not introduce any new negative surplus in O(pt). Thus, we have
|O(pt−1)| = −2
∑
O(pt−1)i<0
O(pt−1)i ≥ −2
∑
O(pt)i<0
O(pt−1)i ≥ −2
∑
O(pt)i<0
O(pt)i = |O(pt)| .
The next two claims bound the range of prices we encounter, which is important for showing that we
approach the unique market equilibrium.
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Claim A.2. Throughout the run of Alg-WGS, every good with negative surplus has price 1. Hence,
there will be at least one good whose price remains 1.
Proof. Observe the following three simple facts about the surplus O(pt) resulting from exact demands:
(1) Throughout the algorithm we never increase the price of any good with negative surplus. (2) The
surplus of any good does not change from non-negative to negative. (3) For any non-equilibrium price
vector, there will always be a good with negative surplus. These facts are direct consequences of the
conditions used to classify goods based on O˜(pt) in the algorithm. Together they prove the claim.
Claim A.3. In Alg-WGS, for any t ≥ 0, all prices in pt are bounded by 2D1 .
Proof. Let p∗ be equilibrium prices according to Assumption 2.1. We show that for any t ≥ 0, pt is always
pointwise smaller than p∗. Assume that this is not true, let t be the smallest value such that there exists
(pt)i > p
∗
i for some i. Note that according to the algorithm, we have pt = Update(pt−1, x,G1) for some
x > 1 and G1 ⊆ [m]. Further, by our classification based on O˜, it is easy to see that O(pt)i > 0 for any
i ∈ G1. This means from pt−1 to pt, only prices of goods in G1 are increased. Let S = {i | (pt)i > p∗i },
then we have S ⊆ G1.
Next, we apply a sequence of price changes to pt. First, for every j /∈ S we increase (pt)j to p∗j . Let
p be the new price vector and consider the surplus O(p) resulting from exact demands. By the WGS
property of the market, the surplus of any good in S will not decrease, hence we still have O(p)i > 0 for
every i ∈ S. The sum of all surpluses in an exchange market is always 0, so ∑j /∈S O(p)j < 0.
Now we decrease the price of every good i ∈ S from pi to p∗i . Then p becomes exactly p∗. This
process will not increase surplus of any good j 6∈ S. Thus we still have∑j /∈S O(p∗)j < 0. This contradicts
the assumption that p∗ are prices of a market equilibrium.
At this point, let us recall Claim 2.4 to establish the relation between the surplus of a good before
and after a multiplicative price update step. It does not involve the approximate oracle.
Claim 2.4 For any price vector p, x > 1 and S ⊆ [m], O(Update(p, x, S))i ≤ x · O(p)i for any i ∈ S.
Next, we establish a statement about the surpluses at the end of each round, which was not necessary
for the version with exact oracles and precision. Intuitively, we increase the prices of goods in G1 until
the minimum surplus in G1 reaches the maximum surplus in G2 or 0. Note that µ is very small and can
be thought of as 0. The main complication here is that we need to work with µ-approximation demands
in the algorithm and the resulting surpluses s′.
Claim A.4. At the end of each round in Alg-WGS, min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≤ max{{s˜′i | i ∈ G2}∪ {µ}}+6µ.
Proof. According to the binary search procedure, we know that if we increase prices in G1 by a factor of
x, then s˜′ satisfies the condition min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≥ max{{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {µ}}. Furthermore, an increase
by x+ = min{y ∈ P | y > x} < x+ 1∆ would result in a surplus vector that does not satisfy this condition.
Let s+ = O(Update(pt−1, x+, G1)). By Assumption 2.2, we have
|s˜+i − s˜′i| ≤ |s+i − s′i|+ 2µ < 2D2 · (x+ − x)|pt−1|+ 2µ ≤
2D2 |pt−1|
∆
+ 2µ ≤ 2
D2+D1+logm
∆
+ 2µ = 3µ
for every i, where the last inequality is derived by Claim A.3. Thus
min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} < min{s˜+i | i ∈ G1}+ 3µ < max{{s˜+i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {µ}} + 3µ
< max{{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} ∪ {µ}} + 6µ
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We are now ready for the key lemma in the proof of the main result – the multiplicative decrease of
the potential function at the end of each round. Let R2 be a sufficiently large constant to be explained
in the end of the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. If x < 1+ 1R2m3 at the end of round t in Alg-WGS, then Φ(pt) ≤ Φ(pt−1)
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
.
Proof. We use the following notation. Let s = O(pt−1), s˜ = O˜(pt−1, µ) and s′ = O(pt), s˜′ = O˜(pt, µ).
The intuition of the proof is similar to the version with exact precision. By the conditions used to define
G1 and G2, we always have s˜ik ≥ s˜i1/e and s˜ik − s˜ik+1 > s˜ik/(m + 1) ≥ s˜i1/e(m + 1). Hence, roughly
speaking, every good in G1 has reasonably large surplus, and there is a reasonably large gap between the
surpluses in G1 and G2. Next, at the end of the current round, we decreased the minimum surplus of a
good in G1 to either min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≈ µ (Case (1) below) or min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≈ max{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} (Case
(2) below). In both cases, the total value of Φ must decrease by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m3).
More formally, if the algorithm proceeds to round t, then ‖s˜‖ > ε′2. By the definition of set G1, we have
s˜i1 ≤ (1 + 1m)s˜i2 ≤ · · · ≤ (1 + 1m)k−1s˜ik < e · s˜ik . Hence, s˜2ik > (s˜i1/e)2 ≥ Φ(pt−1)/(me2) > (ε′/(
√
me))2,
so the surpluses of goods in G1 are similar up to a factor of e and bounded from below. Also we have
(s˜ik − s˜ik+1)2 > (s˜i1/e(m+ 1))2 ≥ Φ(pt−1)/(e2(m+ 1)2m).
Since we rely on an approximate demand oracle, the surpluses of goods in G1 might not change in a
monotone fashion when increasing their prices. Nevertheless, we can relate the surplus in the beginning
and the end of a round as follows. For every i ∈ G1, by Claim 2.4, the surplus from exact demands
satisfies s′i ≤ x · si. Thus
s˜′i ≤ s′i + µ ≤ xsi + µ ≤ x(s˜i + µ) + µ = xs˜i + (1 + x)µ.
Since x < 1+ 1R2m3 , it holds that (1+ x)µ < 3µ ≤ s˜i/(R2m3). This means the increase within a round is
bounded by s˜′i < (1 +
2
R2m3
)s˜i. Since we do not touch the price of any good j ∈ G2, the WGS property
implies for exact demands s′j ≥ sj . Hence s˜′j ≥ s˜j − 2µ.
Now, in order to bound the change of Φ(pt), we consider s˜
′ according to G1 and G2. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: max{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} < µ Intuitively, in this case the algorithm has decreased the surplus of some
good in G1 to approximately 0 (recall that µ is sufficiently small). This decrease alone brings down the
potential function Φ by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m). All other surpluses will cause an increase by a factor of
at most 1 +O(1/m3).
More formally, Claim A.4 gives us µ < min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} < 7µ. Hence, the contribution of goods of
G1 to Φ(pt) can be upper bounded by
k∑
j=1
s˜′2ij <
k−1∑
j=1
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
s˜2ij + 49µ
2.
Furthermore, for every i ∈ G2, if −m3µ ≤ s˜′i ≤ µ, we have s˜′2i ≤ m6µ2, and if s˜′i < −µ, by the WGS
property of the market, we know si ≤ s′i ≤ s˜′i + µ < 0. Thus, since s˜′j ≥ s˜j − 2µ,∑
j∈G2
s˜′j<−m
3µ
s˜′2j ≤
∑
j∈G2
s˜′j<−m
3µ
(s˜j − 2µ)2 ≤
∑
j∈G2
s˜′j<−m
3µ
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
s˜2j .
Hence, the contribution of goods of G2 to Φ(pt) can be upper bounded by
m∑
j=k+1
s˜′2ij ≤
m∑
j=k+1
max
{(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
s˜2ij ,m
6µ2
}
<
m∑
j=k+1
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
s˜2ij +m
6µ2.
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Combining the two parts
Φ(pt) =
m∑
j=1
s˜′2ij <
∑
j 6=k
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
s˜2ij + (m
6 + 49)µ2
=
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2
(Φ(pt−1)− s˜2ik) + (m6 + 49)µ2
<
(
1 +
2
R2m3
)2(
1− 1
e2m
)
Φ(pt−1) +
(
4
R21m
7
+
196
R21m
13
)
ε′2
<
(
1− 1
2e2m
)
Φ(pt−1)
where the last inequality holds for any m ≥ 2 with sufficiently large constants R1, R2.
Case 2: max{s˜′i | i ∈ G2} ≥ µ Intuitively, in this case the gap between surpluses in G1 and G2 decreases
to approximately 0. Below we show that the closing this gap yields a decrease of the potential function
Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m3). All other surpluses will increase by a factor of at most 1 + O(1/m3). In
combination, it turns out that Φ will decrease by a factor of 1− Ω(1/m3).
More formally, in this case min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} ≥ max{s˜′j | j ∈ G2}. Let sG1 = min{s˜′i | i ∈ G1} and
sG2 = max{s˜′j | j ∈ G2}. For every i ∈ G1, let s˜′i = x′s˜i− δi where x′ = (1+ 2R2m3 ), and for every j ∈ G2,
let s˜′j = s˜j − 2µ+ δj . Hence δi, δj ≥ 0 for all i, j. Further, we have |
∑m
i=1 s˜i| ≤ mµ and |
∑m
i=1 s˜
′
i| ≤ mµ ,
hence ∑
i∈G1
δi =
∑
i∈G1
x′s˜i −
∑
i∈G1
s˜′i
≥
∑
i∈G1
s˜i +
∑
j∈G2
s˜′j −mµ =
∑
i∈G1
s˜i +
∑
j∈G2
(s˜j + δj − 2µ)−mµ
≥
∑
j∈G2
δj − 4mµ
and
∑
i∈G1
δi ≥ 1
2
(s˜ik − s˜ik+1 − 4mµ) ≥
1
4
(s˜ik − s˜ik+1).
Now we have
Φ(pt) =
∑
i
s˜′2i =
∑
i∈G1
(x′s˜i − δi)2 +
∑
j∈G2
(s˜j − 2µ+ δj)2
=
∑
i∈G1
x′2s˜2i +
∑
j∈G2
(s˜j − 2µ)2
+
∑
j∈G2
δj(s˜j − 2µ+ δj)−
∑
i∈G1
δi(x
′s˜i − δi)
− ∑
i∈G1
x′s˜iδi
+
∑
j∈G2
δj(s˜j − 2µ) (7)
<
x′2Φ(pt−1)− 4µ ∑
j∈G2
s˜j + 4mµ
2
+
sG2 ∑
j∈G2
δj − sG1
∑
i∈G1
δi
− s˜ik ∑
i∈G1
δi
+(s˜ik+1 − 2µ)
∑
j∈G2
δj (8)
< x′2Φ(pt−1)− 4s˜mmµ+ 4mµ2 + 4sG1mµ+ 4s˜ik+1mµ− (s˜ik − s˜ik+1)
∑
i∈G1
δi (9)
< x′2Φ(pt−1) + 4mµ
2 + 24m2µ− 1
4
(s˜ik − s˜ik+1)2 (10)
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<(
1 +
4
R2m3
+
4
R22m
6
+
16
R21m
12
+
96
R1m4
− 1
4e2(m+ 1)2m
)
Φ(pt−1) (11)
=
(
1− Ω
(
1
m3
))
Φ(pt−1) (12)
Here 7 can be derived by expanding the quadratic formula and appropriately reorganizing the terms.
For the step from (7) to (8), in the first bracket we overestimate the quadratic terms of s˜ into x′2Φ(pt−1)
and |G2| by m. In the second bracket, we return to s˜′i and s˜′j, which in turn are bounded correctly using
sG1 for all i ∈ G1 and sG2 for all j ∈ G2. For the final two terms in (7) and (8) we use the definition of
s˜ik and s˜ik+1 and the fact that x
′ > 1. For the step from (8) to (9), for the first bracket of (8) we use
s˜j ≥ s˜m for every j ∈ G2. For the second bracket of (8) we note s˜G1 ≥ s˜G2 and the difference between
the sums of δ-terms is bounded by 4mµ as noted above. By the same argument, we can transform the
last two terms of (8) as shown. Note that we simply drop −2µ∑j∈G2 δj < 0. From (9) to (10) we use
the fact that every surplus is bounded by 2m in its absolute value by Claim A.1. For the last term we
use the bound for
∑
i∈G1 δi as noted above. From (10) to (11), we just replace µ by its definition and use
the bound Φ(pt−1) > ε′2 and (s˜ik − s˜ik+1)2 > Φ(pt−1)/(e2(m+ 1)2m) as shown above.
Finally, using sufficiently large constants R1, R2, the multiplicative term in (11) can be decreased to
strictly less than 1 for every m ≥ 2. The final expression in (12) captures the asymptotics and proves the
lemma.
The previous lemma shows a decrease in the potential only for rounds in which the x determined by
binary search is rather small. Lemma 2.2 continues to hold here and bounds the number of rounds with
a larger value of x. The following variant differs only in the constant R2, and its proof is literally the
same as for Lemma 2.2.
Lemma A.2. During a run of Alg-WGS, there can be only O(m4D1) many rounds that end with
x ≥ 1 + 1R2m3 .
Finally, we can assemble the properties to show the main result.
Theorem 2.1 For any market that satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, and for any ε > 0, Alg-WGS
returns the price vector of an (1+ ε)-approximate market equilibrium in time polynomial in the input size
and log(1/ε).
Proof. Let xt be the value of x we find in round t of Alg-WGS. First because at least one price will
increase by a factor of xt in round t, by Claim A.3 we have
∏
t xt ≤ 2mD1 . At the end of round t, if
xt ≥ 1 + 1R2m3 , let s = max{si | si ∈ O˜(pt−1)} and s′ = max{si | si ∈ O˜(pt)}, then by Claim ??
we have Φ(pt) ≤ ms′2 ≤ mx2t s2 ≤ mx2tΦ(pt−1). Moreover, by Lemma A.2 there will be at most
O(m4D1) such rounds. Hence the total increase of Φ(pt) in these rounds will be no more than a factor
of
∏
xt≥1+1/R2m3 mx
2
t ≤ mO(m
4D1)22mD1 = mO(m
4D1).
For all other rounds, we have x < 1 + 1
R2m3
, and by Lemma A.1, the potential function is decreased
by a factor of 1/(1 − Ω( 1m3 )). Therefore the total number of rounds before Φ(pt) ≤ ε′2 will be at most
O
(
log1/(1−Ω( 1
m3
))
mO(m
4D1)
ε′2
)
= O
(
D1m
7 logm+m3 log
1
ε
)
In each round, the number of queries to the oracle is no more than O(log∆) = O(D1+D2+logm+log
1
ε ).
We conclude that the total number of queries during the algorithm is O(
(
D1m
7 logm+m3 log 1ε
)
(D1 +
D2 + logm+ log
1
ε )), which is a polynomial in the input size and log(1/ε).
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B Exact Equilibrium for Exchange Markets with Spending Constraint
Utilities
Here we show how to obtain an exact market equilibrium in exchange spending constraint markets. Us-
ing the Alg-Spending-Exact framework we convert the approximate market equilibrium obtained in
Section 3.2 into an exact equilibrium. To achieve this, we rely on the full information of the spending
constraint utilities. This step is an extension of the technique developed in [24] for the linear exchange
markets. However there are several challenges due to the much more involved setting of spending con-
straint utilities, where the allocated partitions make the remaining budgets of agents and the values of
goods dependent on too many parameters. In the following we present how to handle the extra complex-
ity of the problem and this result resolves an open question of [24] of finding an exact polynomial time
algorithm for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities.
Let p be the price vector of an (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium. We first construct a bipartite graph
EG′(p) = (A ∪ G,E) where the edges E is a union of equality edges in EG(p), edges due to positive
endowments, and edges due to allocated segments. The main idea here is to construct a set of components
of agents and goods such that there is no interaction across the components. In addition, we want at
least one good with price 1 in every such component. To achieve this latter condition, whenever there is
a component C of EG′(p) without a good with price 1, we raise the prices of goods in C by a common
factor x > 1 until a new equality edge appears. By Assumption 3.1 a new equality edge will always
emerge in during this procedure because prices of goods in C are increasing, which makes goods outside
C more and more attractive to the agents in C.
The next lemma shows that the updated price vector after the price increase still remains a (1 + ε)-
approximate equilibrium.
Lemma B.1. The price vector p at the end of while loop in Alg-Spending-Exact is a (1 + ε)-
approximate equilibrium.
Proof. Note that we increase prices of goods in a component C when each good has price greater than
one. Corollary 3.1 implies that the surplus of each good in C is zero. Hence, the old allocation will still be
feasible after the price change and the surpluses remain the same. Therefore the updated p will remain
a (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium.
At this stage we can assume that each component of EG′(p) has a good with price 1. We then work
on each component of EG′(p) separately. We assume for convenience that EG′(p) is a single component.
Next we set up a system of linear equations in price variables of the form Ap = b, and show that
the matrix A has full rank. Finally, we will show that by perturbing the vector b slightly we can get
an exact equilibrium. Consider the components of EG(p), i.e., after removing edges due to endowment
and allocated segments from EG′(p). Let C1, . . . , CK be the set of components of EG(p). In each
Cl, 1 ≤ l ≤ K, all goods are connected with each other through a set of equality edges. Whenever there
are two current segments (i, j, k) and (i, j′, k′) of the same agent i, we have the following relation between
the prices of goods j and j′:
uijkpj′ = uij′k′pj. (13)
This implies that for each component Cl, |Cl ∩ G| − 1 of these equations are linearly independent, and
there is essentially one free price variable. Further, since there is no money flow across components with
respect to the current allocations, we have the budget balance condition for each component:
Remaining worth of goods - remaining budgets of agents (after allocated segments)
= sum of surpluses
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Algorithm 5. Alg-Spending-Exact
Input : Exchange market with a set A of agents and a set G of goods; wij , uijk, Bijk are market
parameters as defined in Section 1.1
Output: Prices p of an exact market equilibrium
1 m← |G|; n← |A|; L← total bit length of all input parameters; ε← 1/m4m24m2L
2 p← (1 + ε)-approximate equilibrium using Alg-Spending with Alg-Spending-Rounding
3 s← O(p). If s = (0, 0, . . . , 0) then return p.
4 EG(p)← (undirected) equality graph at prices p /*as defined at the beginning of Section 3*/
5 F ← {(i, j, k) | (i, j, k) is an allocated segment}
6 EG′(p)← EG(p) ∪ {(i, j) | wij > 0} ∪ {(i, j) | (i, j, k) ∈ F for some k}.
7 while EG′(p) contains a connected component C that does not has a good with price 1 do
8 Find the smallest x > 1 such that EG(p) ⊂ EG(Update(p, x, C)).
9 p← Update(p, x, C).
10 Recompute EG(p) and EG′(p).
11 /* Wlog we assume EG′(p) consists of only one connected component. If there are more than one,
then apply the procedure below individually to each component */
12 Let C1, . . . , CK be the connected components of EG(p)
13 Set up the following system of linear equations in price variable
1. p′i = 1 for a good i whose price is 1
2. For each component Cl, 1 ≤ l ≤ K
(a) |Cl| − 1 linearly independent equations of the form uijkp′j′ = uij′k′p′j, where (i, j, k) and
(i, j′, k′) are the current segments.
(b)
∑
j∈Cl∩G p
′
j −
∑
j Rljp
′
j = 0, where
Rlj =
∑
i∈Cl∩A wij(1−
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′ 6∈Cl∩GBij′k) +
∑
i6∈Cl∩Awij
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′∈Cl∩GBij′k
14 p′ ← the solution of above system of equations
15 return p′
For component Cl, the condition reads∑
j∈Cl∩G
(pj −
∑
(i,j,k)∈F
Bijk
∑
j′
wij′pj′)−
∑
i∈Cl∩A
(
∑
j′
wij′pj′ −
∑
(i,j,k)∈F
Bijk
∑
j′
wij′pj′) =
∑
j∈Cl∩G
εj ,
where F is the set of allocated segments. Rearranging the above equation, we get:∑
j∈Cl∩G
pj −
∑
j∈G
pjRlj =
∑
j∈Cl∩G
εj , (14)
where Rlj =
∑
i∈Cl∩A
wij(1−
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′ 6∈Cl∩G
Bij′k) +
∑
i6∈Cl∩A
wij
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′∈Cl∩G
Bij′k
Each Rlj is a rational number with denominator at most 2
2L, where L is the total bit length of all input
parameters wij, uijk and Bijk.
Lemma B.2. For every 1 ≤ l ≤ K and j ∈ Cl ∩G, 0 ≤ Rlj ≤ 1. For every j ∈ G,
∑
lRlj = 1.
Proof. For each good j, we have
∑
iwij = 1. Further both
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′ 6∈Cl∩GBij′k and
∑
(i,j′,k)∈F ;j′∈Cl Bij′k
take values in [0, 1], hence the first claim of the lemma follows. For the second claim,
∑
lRlj =
∑
iwij =
1.
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Let M be the coefficient matrix of the system of equations (14). Then
Mlj =
{
1−Rlj if j ∈ Cl ∩G
−Rlj, otherwise
From Lemma B.2, each column j of M has at most one positive entry, namely Mlj where j ∈ Cl ∩G, and
each column of M sums to zero. There are in total L equations of type (14), one for each component.
Next we eliminate the equations of type (13). Then there will be only one price variable per component.
We designate a representative good for each component, say good l for Cl. Then each price pj in Cl is a
constant multiple of price pl of good l. Let pj = αjpl, where αj is a rational number whose numerator
and denominator are products of at most m uijk’s. Now we can rewrite the budget balance equation (14)
for Cl in terms of L price variables as follows:
pl
∑
j∈Cl∩G
αj −
∑
l′
pl′
∑
j∈Cl′∩G
αjRlj =
∑
j∈Cl∩G
εj
Let Tl =
∑
j∈Cl∩G αj , Sll′ =
∑
j∈Cl′∩G αjRlj , and εl =
∑
j∈Cl∩G εj . The above equation becomes:
plTl −
∑
l′
pl′Sll′ = εl (15)
Let N be the coefficient matrix of the system of equations (15). Then
Nll′ =
{
Tl − Sll if l = l′
−Sll′ , otherwise
Since both Tl and Sll′ are rational numbers with denominator at most 2
mL and 22mL respectively, each
Nll′ is a rational number with denominator at most 2
3mL.
Lemma B.3. 0 ≤ Nll for every l; Nll′ ≤ 0 for every l 6= l′; and
∑
lNll′ = 0 for every l
′.
Proof. The proof essentially follows using Lemma B.2. The first two claims are straightforward, and for
the last claim we have∑
l
Sll′ =
∑
l
∑
j∈Cl′∩G
αjRlj =
∑
j∈Cl′∩G
αj
∑
l
Rlj =
∑
j∈Cl′∩G
αj = Tl′
Since there is a good i with price 1, we assume with loss of generality that good i belongs to component
K, hence αKpK = 1. The next lemma is an adaptation of a result of [24].
Lemma B.4. The K equations consisting of equation (15) for components 1, . . . ,K−1 and the equation
αKpK = 1 are linearly independent.
Proof. Let N ′ be the coefficient matrix of this system of equations. It is easy to check that N ′ is the
same as N except that N ′Li = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. Assume by contradiction that there is a non-zero vector
a = (a1, . . . , aK) such that a
TN ′ = 0. Let al0 be the entry in {a1, . . . , aK−1} that has the largest absolute
value, and with loss of generality we assume that al0 > 0 and the first K
′ entries of a are equal to al0 ,
i.e., a1 = · · · = aK ′ = al0 .
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For each l ≤ K ′ we have
0 =
∑
1≤h<K
ahNhl + aK · 0
= al0
∑
1≤h≤K
Nhl − al0NKl +
∑
K ′<h<K
(ah − al0)Nhl
= −al0NKl +
∑
K ′<h<K
(ah − al0)Nhl
Using Lemma B.3, the above implies that Nhl = 0 for K
′ < h ≤ K and l ≤ K ′. Next we show that
Nlh = 0 for 1 ≤ l ≤ K ′ and K ′ < h ≤ K as well. By summing up the equations (15) for 1 ≤ l ≤ K ′, we
get ∑
l≤K ′
εl =
∑
l≤K ′
Nllpl +
∑
h
∑
l≤K ′;l 6=h
Nlhph
=
∑
l≤K ′
Nllpl +
∑
h≤K ′
∑
l≤K ′;l 6=h
Nlhph +
∑
h>K ′
∑
l≤K ′
Nlhph
=
∑
h≤K ′
Nhhph +
∑
h≤K ′
∑
l 6=h
Nlhph +
∑
h>K ′
∑
l≤K ′
Nlhph
=
∑
h≤K ′
ph
∑
l
Nlh +
∑
h>K ′
∑
l≤K ′
Nlhph
=
∑
h>K ′
∑
l≤K ′
Nlhph.
Since ph ≥ 1 for every h, if some Nlh is non-zero for l ≤ K ′ and h > K ′, then the right-hand side is at
most −1/23mL, which is a contradiction. It implies that Nlh 6= 0 iff both l and h are either less than
or equal to K ′ or larger than K ′. Let A1 and G1 denote the set of agents and goods of components
C1, . . . , CK ′ respectively. Let A2 = A \ A1 and G2 = G \G1. We can further conclude that
• wij = 0 for every i ∈ A1, j ∈ G2, otherwise Nlh 6= 0 for l ≤ K ′ and h > K ′. Similarly wij = 0 for
every i ∈ A2, j ∈ G1.
• Agents in A1 have no allocated goods in G2, otherwise budget balance equations of components
Cl, l > K
′ will have some non-zero pj, 1 ≤ j ≤ K ′ and that will make Nlh 6= 0 for l > K ′ and
h ≤ K ′. Similarly agents in A2 have no allocated goods in G1.
This is impossible since we have assumed that EG′(p) consists of one single component. Therefore N ′
must have full rank.
Overall, we have established that equations of (13), (14) and pi = 1 are linearly independent. We can
write this system in the matrix form as Ap = b, where A is invertible and all entries are rational numbers
with common denominator at most 22L.
Consider the system Ap′ = b′ for a price vector p′, where b′ is a unit vector with a one in the row
corresponding to the equation pi = 1. Next we show that p
′ gives an exact equilibrium. For that we need
to show the following:
(a) Equality edges with respect to p′ and p are the same. This will imply that all allocated segments
remain allocated.
(b) (s,A ∪ G ∪ t) is a min-cut in N(p′). Combining the equation(2b) in step 12 of Alg-Spending-
Exact, this will imply that there is a feasible allocation on current segments which gives surplus
of each good.
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By Cramer’s rule and Lemma B.2, the solution of Ap′ = b′ is a vector of rational numbers with common
denominator D ≤ mm22m(m+1)L. That is, all p′i are of form qi/D, where qi,D are integers. Since
||b|−|b′|| ≤ 2ε, we have |p′i−pi| ≤ 2εD for every i. Let ε′ = 2D2ε, then |Dpi−qi| = D|pi−p′i| ≤ 2εD2 = ε′.
For part (a), suppose uijkpj′ ≤ uij′k′pj then
uijkqj′ ≤ uijk(Dpj′ + ε′) ≤ Duij′k′pj + uijkε′ ≤ uij′k′qj + (uij′k′ + uijk)ε′
< uij′k′qj + 1
Since both uijkqj′ and uij′k′qj are integers, we have uijkp
′
j′ ≤ uij′k′p′j. This implies that all equality edges
with respect to p′ and p are the same. That further implies that all allocated segments remain allocated.
For the part (b), consider the network N(p′) with respect to prices p′. Recall that in N(p′)
• The capacity of edge from source node s to agent i is
∑
j′ wij′p
′
j′(1−
∑
j,k:(i,j,k)∈F Bijk).
• The capacity of a MBB edge from agent i to good j is Bijk
∑
j′ wij′p
′
j′.
Since p′j ’s are all rational numbers with a common denominator D ≤ mm22m(m+1)L, all capacities in
N(p′) are rational numbers with a common denominator no more than D2. Also because |p′i−pi| ≤ 2εD,
the capacity of each edge e in N(p) is at most the capacity of e in N(p′) plus 4εD.
Let c be the capacity of cut (s,A ∪G ∪ t) in N(p′). Suppose there is a min cut in N(p′) with value
less than c. Then that value is at most c − 1/D2. This same cut in N(p) will have value at most
c− 1/D2 + (m+ n +mn)4Dε. Also the capacity of the cut (s,A ∪G ∪ t) in N(p) is at least c− 4nεD.
Therefore the total surplus of goods in N(p) is at least
c− 4nεD −
(
c− 1
D2
)
− (m+ n+mn)4εD = 1
D2
− 4(m+ 2n+mn)εD > ε,
which is a contradiction. Hence condition (b) also holds.
We conclude with our main theorem.
Theorem 3.1 For any spending constraint exchange market satisfying Assumption 3.1, Alg-Spending-
Exact returns the price vector of a market equilibrium in time polynomial in m and L.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6 we know that we arrive at a (1+ ε)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in
m, L, and log(1/ε). For the exact equilibrium, Alg-Spending-Exact solves a system of K ≤ m linear
equations whose entries are polynomially bounded in m and L, hence can be done in polynomial time.
Further, log(1/ε) is a polynomial of m and L as ε = 1/m4m24m
2L. Since M is a polynomial of m, L,
binary search and Rounding run in polynomial time in each round of the framework. Hence, the total
running time of the algorithm is polynomial in m and L.
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